Trade credit, firm profitability, and financial constraints: Evidence from listed SMEs in East Asia and the Pacific by Hoang, Cong Huan. et al.
International Journal of M
anagerial Finance
1
Purpose –The principal objective of this study is to investigate the non-linear association 
between trade credit and profitability of small and medium enterprises (SMEs). Moreover, this 
paper analyses whether the above relationship varies according to financial constraints of 
SMEs. 
Design/methodology/approach – The authors use panel data methodology to conduct 
investigations for a sample of 1,509 non-financial listed SMEs from nine countries or territories 
located in the East Asia and Pacific region, namely, China, Vietnam, Malaysia, Thailand, 
Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong, over the period from 2010 to 2016.
Findings –This study indicates that trade credit receivable (TCR) and trade credit payable 
(TCP) have an inverted U-shaped relationship with SMEs’ profitability, which implies the 
existence of  an optimal trade credit level that balances between costs and benefits to maximize 
their profitability. This result suggests that managers should try to keep the level of trade credit 
investment as close to the optimal point as possible to avoid the case that their profitability 
reduces when they move away from this point. Moreover, this study also finds that the optimal 
trade credit level is sensitive to the financial constraints of SMEs. In particular, optimal level 
of more financially constrained firms is lower than that of less financially constrained firms. 
Originality/value – A number of contributions that this study makes to the existing literature 
are presented as follows. First, the paper takes account of the possible presence of a concave 
relationship between trade credit and SMEs’ profitability, largely ignored by the existing 
empirical literature. Second, it demonstrates this association in terms of both aspects of trade 
credit, including trade credit receivable (TCR) and trade credit payable (TCP). Third, the study 
investigates the effect of the different level of financial constraints faced by SMEs on the 
relationship between trade credit and their profitability. 
Keywords Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs), Trade credit, Profitability, East Asia and 
the Pacific, Financial constraints, Profitability.
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1. Introduction
Trade credit is a financing instrument offered by suppliers to their customers (Cheng and  
Pike, 2003; Lin and  Chou, 2015). The efficiency of trade credit management is essential in 
corporate ﬁnancing policy because it impacts on risks and performance of firms (Lewellen et 
al., 1980; Hill et al., 2012). A wealth of empirical studies have explored the vital role of trade 
credit control through demonstration of its impacts on firms’ profitability (Deloof, 2003; 
García-Teruel and  Martínez-Solano, 2007; Kestens et al., 2012; Martínez-Sola et al., 2014; 
Abuhommous, 2017). In general, those studies have found a linear correlation between the two 
variables, but this linearity divides researchers into two opposing camps. According to the view 
of one camp, the profitability of a firm will improve if it steps up investment in trade credit. 
The opposite camp maintains that high investment in trade credit is related to high risk of 
revenue loss or high financial costs, and hence reduces firm profitability. These controversial 
findings suggest that trade credit may have a non-linear rather than a linear relationship with 
firm profitability. If so, there may exist an optimal trade credit level which maximizes corporate 
profitability. 
Some existing studies on working capital management reveal evidence of a non-linear 
relationship between firms’ investment in working capital and their profitability (Baños-
Caballero et al., 2012; 2014; Mun and  Jang, 2015; Afrifa, 2016; Afrifa and  Padachi, 2016). 
For instance, by using the cash conversion cycle as a measure of working capital, Baños-
Caballero et al. (2012) and Afrifa and Padachi (2016) point towards the existence of a concave 
relationship between these two variables in Spain and the UK respectively. However, the 
limitation of those studies is that they only refer to working capital management in general, 
rather than focus on individual components of working capital, such as trade credit receivable 
and trade credit payable. Understanding the roles of these individual components is step 
forward worth pursuing.
To our best knowledge, only a few studies so far have quested after a potential non-linear 
connection between trade credit and firm performance, but none in the East Asia and Pacific 
context (Martínez-Sola et al., 2013b; Pais and  Gama, 2015; Lyngstadaas and  Berg, 2016). 
Although their findings are quite insightful, these studies have some limitations. Martínez-Sola 
et al. (2013b) provide evidence to support an inverted U-shaped association between these two 
variables in Spain, but they were concerned about firm value rather than firm profitability. 
Furthermore, their study pays particular attention to investment in accounts receivable while 
leaving out accounts payable. Nevertheless,  the usage of trade credit is twofold (Petersen and  
Rajan, 1997). A firm can be viewed as a customer; hence, its accounts payable (TCP) is a proxy 
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for how much it borrows from its suppliers. In contrast, a firm is also a supplier, and accounts 
receivable (TCR) is its lending to customers (Petersen and  Rajan, 1997). Both aspects of trade 
credit are important to firm performance and are interlinked with the necessity to finance 
production (Ferrando and  Mulier, 2013). Consequently, this study treats the firm first as a 
supplier (lender) and then a customer (borrower) to evaluate the critical role of trade credit to 
its profitability. Moreover, Martínez-Sola et al. (2013b)  focus on large firms rather than small 
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Trade credit, however, is of particular importance to 
SMEs (Petersen and  Rajan, 1997). According to García-Teruel and Martínez-Solano (2007), 
these firms have constrained access to external financing, so they face a lack of finance for 
their growth. This difficulty stems from the asymmetry of information between the firm and 
the capital market. The insufficient information decreases the market’s ability to assess the 
firm’s projects and raises its cost of external financing (Baños-Caballero et al., 2014). The use 
of trade credit allows SMEs greater access to funds, because of the comparative advantage of 
commercial creditors in the control and evaluation of credit risk (Schwartz, 1974; Emery, 
1984). Thus, financial constraints faced by SMEs play a key role in trade credit investment 
decisions. Recently, Pais and Gama (2015) and Lyngstadaas and Berg (2016) overlook this 
crucial feature when they demonstrate a non-linear relationship between trade credit and 
profitability of SMEs in Portugal and Norway respectively. Their results nevertheless suggest 
that the relationship between these two variables is convex rather than concave.
To fill the gaps discussed above, the objective of this study is to investigate a non-linear 
relationship between trade credit and profitability of SMEs，with both aspects of trade credit 
( TCR and TCP) considered. In addition, given that financial constraints of SMEs play a crucial 
role in trade credit investment decisions, this study investigates the possible influence of their 
financing constraints on the above relationship.
For these purposes, this paper uses a sample of 1,509 non-financial listed SMEs from 
nine countries or territories located in East Asia and the Pacific  China, Vietnam, Malaysia, 
Thailand, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong. This region is selected for 
several reasons. Firstly, East Asia and the Pacific has experienced rapid economic growth and 
has functioned as an engine of growth for the global economy (Asian Development Bank, 
2014). Secondly, SMEs face great hurdles in accessing formal finance in economies around 
the world, but the challenge is the greatest in this area. According to Stein et al. (2013), 
seventeen million formal SMEs worldwide report that their demand for financial access is 
underserved or unserved by the formal financial sector, with eight million of these located in 
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East Asia and the Pacific. The share of the SMEs justifies our selection of the region. Thirdly, 
the East Asia and Pacific region consists of forty countries but only these nine countries or 
territories have well developed public equity markets for SMEs (The World Bank, 2018). 
Although some other nations in this area also have SME boards, the number of listed firms is 
too small. For example, Cambodia Securities Exchange (CSX) was established in 2011 but has 
only two companies listed in total (Asian Development Bank, 2015). Finally, SMEs in these 
countries have shown a rising trend in both trade credit receivable (TCR) and trade credit 
payable (TCP) from 2010 to 2016. Figure 1 demonstrates that the TCR reached approximately 
0.39 in 2011 from 0.25 in 2010. It decreased to 0.3 in 2012 before recovering steadily 
afterwards. The figure also shows that TCP remained quite stable and stayed below bank loans 
from 2010 to 2014. Since then, it increased significantly, exceeding the latter after 2015. Such 
change offers us an excellent opportunity to examine our objectives set out above.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
Findings of this study indicate that TCR and TCP have an inverted U-shaped 
relationship with SMEs’ profitability in the countries or territories examined. That is, 
investment in trade credit has a positive relationship with firm profitability at lower levels of 
trade credit; but this association becomes negative at higher levels. Consequently, there exists 
an optimal trade credit level at which SMEs can maximize profitability. In addition, when firms 
are classified into two groups according to their cash flow and external financing cost, designed 
to calculate the level of financial constraints, this study finds that both less and more financially 
constrained firms face a concave association between trade credit and profitability, but their 
optimal levels of trade credit differ. In particular, the less financially constrained firms have a 
higher optimal level than the more financially constrained firms.  
A number of contributions that this study makes to the existing literature are presented 
as follows. First, the study offers new evidence on the influence of trade credit on firms’ 
profitability, by taking account of the possible existence of a concave association between trade 
credit and profitability. This is largely overlooked by the existing empirical literature. Second, 
this study considers both aspects of trade credit, including trade credit receivable (TCR) and 
trade credit payable (TCP). Third, this study investigates how the relationship between trade 
credit and SMEs’ profitability varies according to their financial constraints. 
The remainder of this paper is organised into five sections. The second section contains 
theoretical foundations and hypothesis development; the third describes the data and regression 
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models; the fourth carries out the analyses and provides an explanation of the empirical results, 
and the fifth reports robustness and endogeneity check. The final section is conclusions.  
2. Theoretical foundations and hypothesis development
2.1. Trade credit and firm profitability
Trade credit is a commercial credit that occurs when a vendor sells his merchandise on 
credit, instead of requiring immediate payment (Preve and  Sarria-Allende, 2010). Firms have 
the motivati n to offer more trade credit to their customers, mainly because it may increase 
firms’ sales, and can consequently lead to higher profitability (Martínez-Sola et al., 2014). 
Furthermore, the incentive of firms to hold positive trade credit receivable arises from a 
number of advantages. Firstly, trade credit allows buyers to evaluate product quality before 
making payment, so it alleviates the information asymmetry between suppliers and buyers 
(Long et al., 1993). If customers are not satisfied with the quality, they can return the product 
without payment (Smith, 1987). Accordingly, trade credit can also be viewed as an implicit 
quality guarantee and helps a firm to strengthen its long-term relationship with the customers 
(Deloof and  Jegers, 1996). Secondly, trade credit allows firms to have a flexible approach to 
pricing (Brennan et al., 1988). By adjusting either the discount for prompt payment or  the 
credit period, they can sell merchandise at various prices (Brennan et al., 1988). Thirdly, more 
trade credit reduces the storage costs for supplier firms because it encourages customers to 
acquire more products (Ferris, 1981). Finally, trade credit is also treated as a short-term 
investment whereby the granting firm can increase revenue through the implicit interest rates 
incentive (Emery, 1984; Neale and  Shipley, 1985).As a consequence of these benefits, this 
study expects that the profitability of a firm increases with an increase in its trade credit 
receivable. Nevertheless, high accounts receivable is also linked to possible adverse effects, 
which may lower firm profitability. According to Petersen and Rajan (1997), granting more 
trade credit exposes a firm to the financial risks of no payment or late payment from customers. 
In order to limit this problem, the firm will incur high administrative costs for assessing credit 
risk and structuring delayed payment contracts (Kim and  Atkins, 1978; Emery, 1984). 
Furthermore, a high provision of trade credit locks up a large amount of money in accounts 
receivable (Nadiri, 1969). This might hamper firms’ ability to take up value-enhancing 
investment projects because of insufficient funds. In this case, the firm may be forced to obtain 
additional funds at extra costs from the capital market (Watson and  Head, 2010). Based on the 
above discussions, it might be argued that the costs of investment in accounts receivable 
surpass its benefits, and hence, if a firm keeps high levels of receivables, it will receive lower 
profit. 
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The conflicting views on trade credit decision suggest that this decision may involve a 
cost-benefit trade-off. Consequently, this study expects the existence of an optimal trade credit 
level at which a firm can balance costs and benefits to maximize profitability. Hypothesis 1 is 
presented as follows:  
 Hypothesis 1: Extending trade credit to customers has an inverted U-shaped relationship 
with SMEs’ profitability.
Hypothesis 1A: Extending trade credit will positively impact on SMEs’ profitability at 
lower levels of trade credit granted. 
Hypothesis 1B: Extending trade credit will negatively impact on SMEs’ profitability at 
higher levels of trade credit granted.
Not only do firms grant trade credit to customers, but they also demand trade credit from 
their own suppliers, generally by stretching payments (Deloof and  Jegers, 1996; Berger and  
Udell, 1998; Wilner, 2000). By doing this, a firm might take full advantage of a better cash 
flow position for its operation (Petersen and  Rajan, 1997). Also, trade credit can be considered 
as a short-term loan that sellers provide to buyers (Mian and  Smith, 1992). For SMEs, trade 
credit from suppliers is widely used and presented as an essential portion of their finance 
(Demirgüç-Kunt and  Maksimovic, 1999; Cunat, 2006). The reason is that these firms often 
have limited access to credit from traditional banks, and therefore, they tend to depend on trade 
credit payable as a substitute for bank loans (Berger et al., 2001; Fisman and  Love, 2003; Love 
et al., 2007).
Apart from financial constraints, SMEs may have an incentive to receive trade credit 
because of its benefits. According to Van Horne and Wachowicz (2008), trade credit is readily 
available without a formal arrangement or contract. In addition, it is a flexible means of finance 
because firms do not need to pledge collateral, sign a note, or adhere to a strict payment 
schedule on a note (Huyghebaert, 2006; Van Horne and  Wachowicz, 2008). Finally, trade 
credit can decrease payment transaction costs by  separating the exchange of the product from 
the immediate use of money (Ferris, 1981). This can help firms to decrease precautionary cash 
holdings because they can anticipate their cash flow for payment and can manage their financial 
resources more efficiently. From the above discussion, the receipt of trade credit from suppliers 
helps SMEs to overcome their financial constraints. It guarantees that SMEs have enough cash 
flow for their operations. Thus, more trade credit payable can raise firms’ profitability. On  the 
other hand,  stretching payment may also damage the long-term relationship between buyers 
and suppliers, and a firm may spend extra cost to find alternative suppliers (Cunat, 2006). If 
the firm habitually fails to make payment on time or stretches its payables excessively, its 
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suppliers will rank it as a low creditworthy customer. As a result, it will face difficult barriers 
to accessing the financial market in the future (Van Horne and  Wachowicz, 2008). In the event 
of late payment, a supplier can stop the supply of the common good and raise the terms of trade 
credit contracts to disrupt the firm’s business operation (Cunat, 2006). Moreover, Ng et al. 
(1999) also argue that by stretching payment, firms might not only lose the amount of discount 
for early payment but also pay the highest rate of interest for the use of these funds. As a result, 
trade credit is an expensive form of finance, and usage of it for short-term finance might lead 
to reduced firm profitability (Van Horne and  Wachowicz, 2008). 
Given the costs and benefits of trade credit payable, this study proposes that receipt of trade 
credit has a non-linear relationship with firm profitability. In particular, it proposes the 
following hypotheses:   
Hypothesis 2: Receipt of trade credit by SMEs from their suppliers has an inverted U-
shaped relationship with their profitability.
Hypothesis 2A: Receipt of trade credit will positively impact SMEs’ profitabiliy at lower 
levels of trade credit received. 
Hypothesis 2B: Receipt of trade credit will negatively impact SMEs’ profitability at higher 
levels of trade credit received.
2.2. Investment in trade credit and financial constraints
Given that restriction on access to finance is more severe a problem for SMEs, this study 
expects that the optimal level of trade credit changes according to different levels of financing 
constraints faced by firms. According to Kim and Chung (1990), investment in accounts 
receivable is highly associated with the financing condition of firms. In this line, Petersen and 
Rajan (1997) show that the provision of trade credit is positively related to a firm’s ability to 
access finance. Accordingly, firms with financial stability are inclined to offer more trade credit 
to their customers than firms suffering from financial constraints (Schwartz, 1974). Similarly, 
Meltzer (1960) indicates that firms with a larger capacity to generate internal cash flow and 
better access to capital market tend to offer more trade credit to their customers. Conversely, 
firms in financial distress will keep a lower level of trade credit provision (Molina and  Preve, 
2009). The reason is that such firms experience restricted access to the capital market and pay 
higher costs for raising external funds. In such situation, accounts receivable is seen as a cash 
management tool. Thus, more financially constrained firms may have a higher propensity to 
save cash from operating cash flows to ensure available source of internal finance for their 
investment opportunities, while less financially constrained firms do not (Acharya et al., 2007). 
Based on the above discussion, this study proposes the following hypothesis:  
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Hypothesis 3: More financially constrained companies will have a lower optimal level of trade 
credit receivable than less financially constrained companies.
In addition, Carbo-Valverde et al. (2016) suggest that receipt of trade credit is also 
sensitive to the financial constraints facing SMEs. A firm with the availability of cash flow 
often does not face financial constraints because it is less dependent on external funding 
(Afrifa, 2016). However, if the available cash flow is not sufficient to finance production, the 
firm must rely on external finance. Bank loans and trade credit are the two main alternatives of 
external funding, of which trade credit from suppliers is more expensive (Ng et al., 1999; 
Psillaki and  Eleftheriou, 2015; Carbo-Valverde et al., 2016). More ﬁnancially constrained 
ﬁrms tend to employ higher degree of trade credit from suppliers by postponing payment for 
raw materials (Petersen and  Rajan, 1997). This leads to an increase in financial costs, and 
hence, those firms experience decreased profitability. Conversely, the availability of cash flow 
allows unconstrained firms to pay their suppliers in advance. This not only helps the firms to 
enhance the business relationship with their creditors but also gives them opportunities to 
benefit from discount policies in the future (Ng et al., 1999). Thus, unconstrained firms will 
enjoy more advantages of trade credit from creditors to improve their performance than 
financially constrained firms. From this discussion, this paper expects the following: 
Hypothesis 4: More financially constrained companies will have a lower optimal level of trade 
credit payable than less financially constrained companies.
3. Data and regression models 
3.1. Data and summary statistics
This study utilises panel data of SMEs for the seven-year period from 2010 to 2016. 
During this time, liquidity and financial constraints were raised amongst the SMEs in the 
aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis (Martínez-Sola et al., 2014). Such constraints should 
make the efficiency of trade credit management even more critical. The selection of SMEs is 
based on the following criteria. Firstly, these firms must be listed on the SME board of a public 
equity market in the East Asia - Pacific region. This sample covers nine countries or territories, 
including China, Vietnam, Malaysia, Thailand, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and 
Hong Kong. The selection of listed SMEs as a focus is because their financial statements are 
more accurate and more reliable than those of their non-listed counterparts. Secondly, these 
firms must meet the definition of small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) set by each 
country (see Appendix A). 
In addition to those selection criteria, this study applies a series of filters based on earlier 
studies (García-Teruel and  Martínez-Solano, 2007; Pais and  Gama, 2015; Lyngstadaas and  
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Berg, 2016). Specifically, firms with anomalies in their accounting data are also excluded. For 
instance, firms are excluded if their total assets, sales, trade credit receivable and trade credit 
payable have negative values, and if their total assets differ from total liabilities and equity. 
Financial firms are excluded from the sample because these firms have very different 
accounting requirements and asset structures from non-financial ones. The final sample 
consists of 1,509 non-financial listed SMEs, which amounts to an unbalanced panel of 10,537 
firm-year observations. (Table 1). 
[Insert Table 1 here]
The required financial and accounting firm-level data are retrieved from Bloomberg and 
DataStream Thomson One. The country-level data, such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
growth is gathered from the World Bank database, but that of Taiwan is collected from National 
Statistics (2018). Further, both dependent and independent variables are winsorized at 5% and 
95% to overcome the influence of outliers.
3.2. Variables and regression models
3.2.1. The non-linear relationship between trade credit and firm profitability
In order to check whether or not the relationship between trade credit and firm 
profitability is non-monotonic, this study builds two quadratic models as follows:
For trade credit receivable (TCR): 
PROit = β0 + β1 TCRit + β2 TCRit2 + β3 LEVit + β4 CASHit + β5 LIQit + β6 ATANit +                            
β7 GROWTHit + β8  SIZEit + β9 INDUSTit + β10  GDPit + ηi + λt + εit                    (1)
For trade credit payable (TCP): 
PROit = β0 + β1 TCPit + β2 TCPit2 + β3 LEVit + β4 CASHit + β5 LIQit + β6 ATANit +                             
β7 GROWTHit + β8 SIZEit + β9 INDUSTit + β10  GDPit + ηi + λt + εit                      (2)
where PROit is the firm profitability; measured by the gross operating income (PRO1) 
and the net operating income (PRO2).  Following Deloof (2003) and Baños-Caballero et al. 
(2012), this study uses these proxies because they are better than the Return on Assets (ROA) 
in reflecting the operational efficiency of firms. Moreover, two different measures of firm 
profitability are used in order to ascertain the robustness of the results. 
The main independent variables are trade credit receivable (TCR), and trade credit 
payable (TCP). The square of trade credit receivable (TCR2) and that of trade credit payable 
(TCP2) are included in equations (1) and (2) as independent variables to test for non-linearity. 
Moreover, this study also includes control variables that impact on firm profitability based on 
earlier studies (Deloof, 2003; García-Teruel and  Martínez-Solano, 2007; Baños-Caballero et 
al., 2012; Martínez-Sola et al., 2014; Afrifa and  Padachi, 2016). These include financial 
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leverage (LEV), cash ratio (CASH), liquidity ratio (LIQ), assets tangibility (ATAN), sales 
growth (GROWTH), firm size (SIZE), industry deviation (INDUST) and the growth rate of 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP). All variables are defined in Appendix B. According to 
Modigliani and Miller (1963), debt is the cheapest source of finance because of its lower cost 
and tax deductibility. Hence, this study expects that the association between LEV and SMEs’ 
profitability is positive. Moreover, it is expected that there is a positive association between 
CASH and firm profitability, because high cash holdings can reduce firms’ dependence on 
costly external financing and increase their likelihood of undertaking value-enhancing projects 
(Chen, 2008). Next, LIQ is expected to have a positive relationship with firm profitability 
because the availability of liquidity allows SMEs to have better control over their business 
operations. The relationship between ATAN and firm profitability is expected to be positive 
too. Firms holding more tangible assets can gain easy access to external finance from the capital 
market for their operations because those assets can be offered as good collaterals (Titman and  
Wessels, 1988; Rajan and  Zingales, 1995; Himmelberg et al., 1999). GROWTH is also 
expected to have a positive association with firm profitability because a firm with high sales 
growth will utilise fully its capital to create more revenue, which results in higher profitability 
(Brush et al., 2000). Moreover, the study expects the relationship between firm size and 
profitability to be either way. While Yang and Chen (2009) find a negative relationship 
between firm size and firm performance, Berger and Ofek (1995) find a positive association. 
In addition, this study expects that GDP has a positive effect on the profitability of firms 
because firms will increase profitability significantly when they operate in countries with good 
economic conditions (Niskanen and  Niskanen, 2006). To control for various industries, the 
variable INDUST is included in the model (Martínez-Sola et al., 2018). The parameter ɳi is 
unobservable heterogeneity and λt controls for time impacts. Finally, εit is a random 
disturbance.
From equations (1) and (2), an optimal point is obtained by taking derivative of firm 
profitability (PRO) with respect to the trade credit variables (TCR and TCP) and setting this 
derivative to zero.
For trade credit receivable (TCR):       dPRO / dTCR = β1 + 2 β2 TCR
The optimal point:                                              TCR* = - β1 / (2 β2) (3)
For trade credit payable (TCP):            dPRO / dTCP = β1 + 2 β2 TCP
The optimal point:                                              TCP* = - β1 / (2 β2)                                     (4)
To verify our main hypotheses, TCR* and TCP* should be positive and hence 
economically meaningful, this study requires 2 to be negative when β1 is positive. 
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In this study, all hypotheses are tested based on panel data regression. This is because it 
allows us to control for the presence of unobservable heterogeneity. Individuals or firms are 
heterogeneous, and their different characteristics are difficult to observe and hard to measure 
(Himmelberg et al., 1999). Hence, this method helps us to eliminate the risk of obtaining biased 
results arising from such heterogeneity (Hsiao, 1985). This study conducts a Hausman (1978) 
test to choose between Fixed Effect Model (FEM) and Random Effect Model (REM) under the 
null hypothesis of no correlation between the independent variables and the unobserved 
company heterogeneity (ɳi) (Hausman, 1978). When the result of the Hausman test rejects this 
null hypothesis, it means that the REM is not preferred and the FEM is appropriate for this 
study (Brooks, 2008). Additionally, this study uses the Modified Wald test and the Wooldridge 
test to check heteroscedasticity and serial correlation respectively. If these two tests show the 
presence of these problems in the model, the study will estimate all models with robust standard 
errors. 
3.2.2.  Financial constraints affect the non-linear relationship between trade credit and firm 
profitability 
This section will check whether or not the status of SMEs’ financial constraints impacts on 
their optimal level of trade credit. Following Baños-Caballero et al. (2014) and Afrifa (2016), 
cash flow ratio is used as a proxy for the existence of financial constraints and to classify firms 
because it reflects the ability of firms to generate internal resources (Afrifa, 2016). When a firm 
has a cash flow below the sample median, it is expected to be more likely to face financing 
constraints. This ratio is calculated as the ratio of earnings before interest and tax plus 
depreciation to total assets.
Moreover, this study also categorizes firms according to the cost of external financing, 
calculated as the ratio of financial expenses to total debt (Baños-Caballero et al., 2014). Firms 
with the cost of external financing above the sample median are considered financially 
constrained. Otherwise, they are less likely to face financial constraints. Hence, using two 
different proxies for the existence of financing constraints verifies the robustness of the results. 
For this purpose, two models are represented as follows:
For trade credit receivable (TCR):
PROit = β0 + (β1 + α1 FCit)TCRit + (β2 + α2 FCit)TCRit2 + β3 LEVit + β4 CASHit + β5 LIQit +      
β6 ATANit + β7 GROWTHit + β8 SIZEit + β9 INDUSTit + β10  GDPit +  ηi + λt + εit,   (5)
For trade credit payable (TCP):
PROit = β0 + (β1 + α1 FCit)TCPit + (β2 + α2 FCit)TCPit2 + β3 LEVit + β4 CASHit + β5 LIQit  +        
β6 ATANit + β7 GROWTHit + β8 SIZEit + β9 INDUSTit + β10  GDPit + ηi + λt + εit   (6)
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where all independent and dependent variables are defined in Appendix B. FC is a 
dummy variable representing financial constraints. For more financially constrained firms, it 
takes a value of 1. Otherwise, its value is zero. According to equations (5) and (6), the optimum 
of less constrained firms is - β1/ 2β2 while that of more constrained firms is – (β1 + α1) / 2 (β2 + 
α2).
4. Analysis and results 
4.1. Descriptive statistics and correlation analysis
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics of all variables in this research. It shows that the 
mean value of gross operating income (PRO1) and that of net operating income (PRO2) are 
similar, 20.73% and 17.97% respectively. On the other hand, the mean value of TCR (0.2487) 
is much higher than that of TCP (0.0805), implying that SMEs on average are more likely to 
extend rather than receiving trade credit. Their average debt level (LEV) is low and they tend 
to hold high level of cash (CASH) and liquid assets (LIQ) , all pointing to the presence of 
financial constraints. They also have low average fixed asset (ATAN) hence low capacity to 
borrow, which perhaps explains their low debt level. Their average annual sales growth 
(GROWTH) is rather impressive (10.77%), but the average GDP growth across these nine 
countries or territories is a modest 4.45%. With the exception of firm size (SIZE), all averages 
are higher than the medians, hence the sample has a skewed distribution. The large standard 
deviations arises from the fact that these firms are drawn from different countries or territories 
which have different definitions of SMEs.
[Insert Table 2 here]
In Table 3, this paper reports the correlations among all variables considered in this 
study. The purpose of this analysis is to identify the presence of multi-collinearity in regression 
analysis. According to Brooks (2008), high correlations between the independent variables and 
dependent variables do not cause multi-collinearity. However, high correlations among 
independent variables suggest that the model is suffering from multi-collinearity. This problem 
occurs in the regression analysis only if the correlation coefficient between the independent 
variables is higher than 0.80 or 0.90 (Field, 2009). As can be seen in Table 3, none of the 
correlations among the independent variables exceeds these thresholds. 
[Insert Table 3 here]
4.2. The non-linear relationship between trade credit and firm profitability
Before providing an explanation of results, this paper conducts a Hausman (1978) test to 
choose between the FEM and the REM. In Table 4, the p-value of the Hausman test is 
significant at the 1 per cent level, and hence, the FEM is an appropriate model. Moreover, the 
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p-value of the Modified Wald test and that of the Wooldridge test are significant at the 1 per 
cent level. These results indicate the presence of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation in the 
FEM. For this reason, all models in this research are estimated with robust standard errors. 
Table 4 contains the estimated results of the influence of TCR and TCP on firm 
profitability. The dependent variable in Columns 1 and 2 is gross operating income (PRO1), 
and that in Columns 3 and 4 is net operating income (PRO2). The signs of TCR and TCR2 are 
unchanged for the two alternative proxies of firm profitability. The coefficient of TCR is 
positive and significant at the 1 per cent level in both Columns 1 and 3, while that of TCR2 is 
negative and significant at the 1 per cent level. This finding is consistent with our expectation 
that TCR has an inverted U-shaped relationship with firm profitability. This means that there 
exists an optimal level of TCR at which SMEs can balance between costs and benefits to 
maximize their profitability. From Table 4, the coefficient of TCR has a value of 0.187, and 
the coefficient of TCR2 is -0.292 when gross operating income (PRO1) is used. According to 
formula (3), the optimal TCR is (-0.187) / 2 x (-0.292) = 0.320. High investment in TCR up to 
this point increases sales, thereby raises profitability. After this point, profitability decreases 
with TCR because of the adverse effect of financial risk. The optimal TCR changes only 
slightly, from 0.320 to 0.312 when gross operating income is replaced by net operating income 
as a measure of profitability. 
In Columns 2 and 4, the coefficient of TCP is statistically significant and positive and its 
square is statistically significant and negative at the 1 per cent level for the two different 
measures of firm profitability. This finding confirms that there is an inverted U-shaped 
relationship between TCP and firm profitability, which is consistent with our expectation. The 
coefficient of TCP has a value of 0.919 and the coefficient of TCP2 is -2.361 when gross 
operating income (PRO1) is used as a proxy for firm profitability. According to formula (4), 
the optimal level of TCP is at 0.195. Below this point, the benefits of receipt of trade credit 
dominate the costs, hence TCP impacts positively on firms’ profitability. Conversely, when 
firms have trade credit level above this optimum, the effects of financial costs dominate the 
benefits, and therefore, TCP has a negative impact on profitability. The optimal TCP rises only 
slightly to 0.202 when net operating profit is used in place of gross operating profit.
[Insert Table 4 here]
Among the control variables, the impacts of LEV, CASH, ATAN and GROWTH are 
all positive and significant at the 1 per cent level and their magnitudes close. The significance 
of CASH perhaps explains why LIQ is mostly insignificant as the two are close substitutes. On 
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top of these, both INDUST and GDP have large and significant explanatory power for firm 
profitability.
4.3. Trade credit and firm profitability under financial constraints
Table 5 shows the regression results for less and more financially constrained firms 
categorized according to cash flow and external financing cost. The results show a non-linear 
relationship between trade credit and profitability for both more and less financially 
constrained firms for the two alternative proxies of firm profitability. The less financially 
constrained firms have large positive and significant coefficients of TCR and TCP (β1 >0) at 
the 1 per cent level in all classifications used. Their coefficients of TCR2 and TCP2 are negative 
and significant (β2 <0) at the 1 per cent level and large in magnitude. The results show the 
presence of a concave relationship between trade credit and profitability for these firms. On the 
other hand, for more financially constrained firms, while their coefficients of TCR and TCP 
are still positive ((β1 + α1) >0) and those of TCR2 and TCP2 are negative ((β2 + α2) <0), the 
absolute value of these coefficients are much smaller. The F1 tests for the coefficients of TCR 
and TCP (i.e. (β1 + α1)) and F2 tests for the coefficients of TCR2 and TCP2 (i.e. (β2 + α2)) are 
mostly significant, confirming the concave relationship for the more financially constrained 
firms.
With all measures of financial constraints and profitability, the optimal TCR level for 
more constrained firms is lower than that for the less constrained, which is consistent with 
intuition.  For instance, with gross operating income as dependent variable and the cash flow 
used as a proxy for financial constraints, the coefficient of TCR has a value of 0.307 and that 
of the TCR2 is -0.328 for less financially constrained firms. Thus, the optimal TCR for less 
financially constrained firms (FC = 0) is 0.468. For more financially constrained firms (FC=1), 
the value of coefficient of TCR is 0.061 and that of coefficient of TCR2 is -0.185. Hence, the 
optimal TCR is a much lower 0.165. When external financing cost is used to classify the firms 
and the gross operating income is still used as a proxy for profitability, the difference is much 
smaller but the optimal TCR for more constrained firm (0.319) is still lower than that for the 
less constrained (0.352). A similar pattern emerged when net operating income is used as a 
profit proxy.
Similarly, the estimation suggests that the optimal level of TCP is lower for the more 
constrained firms than for the less constrained ones. For instance, with cash flow as a 
classification factor, the optimal TCP of the more constrained firms is 0.231 when gross 
operating income is used as a profit proxy and 0.260 when net operating income is used. The 
corresponding numbers for their less constrained counterpart are 0.444 and 0.463 respectively. 
Page 21 of 49 International Journal of Managerial Finance
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
International Journal of M
anagerial Finance
15
Again, when external financing cost is used as a classification factor, the optimal TCP is closer 
between the two types of firms although it is still lower for the more constrained firms. The 
optimal TCP is also lower across the board compared to the conclusion reached when cash 
flow is used as a classification factor. For example, these numbers are 0.189 and 0.188 
respectively for the more constrained firms when gross operating income and net operating 
income are used in turn as profit proxy. The corresponding number for the less constrained are 
0.196 and 0.194.
 In all, the less financially constrained firms have both higher level of optimal trade credit 
receivable and trade credit payable than the more constrained ones regardless which proxy is 
used for financial constraints and which for profit. The level of optimality does change with 
the proxy choice but this central message is unaltered.
[Insert Table 5 here]
5. Robustness and endogeneity check
5.1. Deviation from the optimal trade credit level
The above results show the existence of an optimal trade credit which maximizes the 
profitability of SMEs. However, firms often cannot accurately estimate their optimal trade 
credit level because of the effects of some factors that change over time, such as opportunity 
cost of capital, the rate of customer default, or bad debt on their trade credits (Nadiri, 1969). 
Consequently, firms may estimate the trade credit level below or above their optimal point. 
In this section, this study checks for robustness the earlier result by identifying 
association between deviations on both sides of the optimal trade credit level and firm 
profitability. If there exists an optimal point, any above-optimal or below- optimal deviation 
from this point will reduce the profitability of a firm. Based on Baños-Caballero et al. (2012), 
this paper employs a two-stage methodology as follows to test for robustness: 
Stage 1:  This study follows the previous studies of García‐Teruel and Martínez‐Solano 
(2010a), and García‐Teruel and Martínez‐Solano (2010b) to identify the determinants of both 
trade credit receivable (TCR) and trade credit payable (TCP).
For trade credit receivable (TCR):
TCR*it = β0 + β1SIZE it + β2 GROWTH it + β3 STDEBT it  + β4 TURN it + β5 CFLOW it                        
+ β6 GROF it + ηi + λt + vit                                                   (7)
For trade credit payable (TCP):
TCP*it = β0 + β1SIZEit + β2GROWTHit + β3STDEBTit + β4LTDEBTit + β5TURNit                             
+ β6CFLOWi,t + β7CASH it + ηi + λt + vit                                                  (8)
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where TCR* is the optimal trade credit receivable, which is measured as accounts 
receivable ÷ sales. TCP* is the optimal trade credit payable, which is calculated as accounts 
payable ÷ total assets. Firm size (SIZE) is the natural logarithm of total assets. Sales growth 
(GROWTH) is measured as (Salest – Salest-1) ÷ Salest-1. Short-term finance (STDEBT) is 
calcul ted as short-term financial debt ÷ total assets. Long-term finance (LTDEBT) is 
calculated as long-term debt ÷ total assets. Product quality (TURN) is measured by total sales 
÷ (total assets - accounts receivable). Cash flow (CFLOW) is calculated as (net income + 
depreciation) ÷ total sales. Cash ratio (CASH) is calculated as (cash + cash equivalents) ÷ total 
assets. Profit margin (GROF) is calculated by gross profit ÷ sales. The parameter ɳi is 
unobservable heterogeneity. λt controls for time effects and vit is random disturbance.
Stage 2:  From equations (7) and (8), residuals are obtained and considered as a proxy 
for the deviations from the optimal point. These residuals are defined as DEVIATION_TCR 
for trade credit receivable and DEVIATION_TCP for trade credit payable. Both variables are 
included in equations (1) and (2) after excluding TCR, TCR2, TCP, and TCP2 to investigate 
how these deviations from the optimal trade credit level impact on firms’ profitability. Two 
models are built as follows:
For trade credit receivable (TCR):
PROit = α0 + α1 DEVIATION_TCRit + α2 LEVit + α3 CASHit + α4 LIQit + α5 ATANit +                     
α6 GROWTHit + α7 SIZEit + α8 INDUSTit + α9 GDPit + ηi + λt + εit                             (9)
For trade credit payable (TCP):
PROit = α0 + α1 DEVIATION_TCPit + α2 LEVit + α3 CASHit + α4 LIQit + α5 ATANit +                      
α6 GROWTHit + α7 SIZEit + α8 INDUSTit + α9 GDPit + ηi + λt + εit                                 (10)
where all independent variables and dependent variables are defined in Appendix B. In 
equations (9) and (10), it is expected that the value of α1 is below zero as deviations from the 
optimum negatively affect firm profitability. 
To test our hypotheses, this study further analyses the influence of both deviations, 
including below and above optimal trade credit level, on firm profitability. In order to fulfill 
this purpose, the paper identifies the variable INTERACT_TCR for trade credit receivable and 
INTERACT_TCP for trade credit payable and adds them to equations (9) and (10). The 
equations are formulated as follows:  
For trade credit receivable (TCR):
PROit = α0 + α1 DEVIATION_TCRit + α2 INTERACT_TCRit + α3 LEVit + α4 CASHit + α5 LIQit 
+α6 ATANit + α7 GROWTHit + α8 SIZEit + α9 INDUSTit + α10 GDPit + ηi + λt + εit                  (11)                          
For trade credit payable (TCP):
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PROit = α0 + α1 DEVIATION_TCPit + α2 INTERACT_TCPit + α3 LEVit + α4 CASHit + α5 LIQit 
+ α6 ATANit + α7 GROWTHit + α8 SIZEit + α9 INDUSTit + α10 GDPit + ηi + λt + εit            (12)                                
where INTERACT_TCR is DEVIATION_TCR * above-optimal deviation, and 
INTERACT_TCP is DEVIATION_TCP * above-optimal deviation. The above-optimal 
deviation is a dummy variable, and it takes a value of 0 for negative residual and 1 otherwise. 
In equations (11) and (12), α1 and (α1 + α2) represent the impact of below-optimal deviation 
and above-optimal deviation on firm profitability respectively. If the actual trade credit level is 
lower than the optimal, the above-optimal deviation will be equal to 0 and α1 accounts for its 
effect on firm profitability. Otherwise, the above-optimal deviation will be equal to 1, and (α1 
+ α2) accounts for the effect. When a firm has an optimal point of trade credit, both above-
optimal and below-optimal deviations decrease the firm profitability. Therefore, the study 
expects the values of α1 and (α1 + α2) to be both negative. 
Table 6 displays the change of firm profitability when trade credit deviates from the 
optimal level for two alternative measures of firm profitability. Columns 1, 3, 5 and 7 display 
results without differentiating the differing effects of below- and above-optimum. The 
coefficients of DEVIATION_TCR and DEVIATION_TCP are negative and statistically 
significant at the 1 per cent level (α1 < 0). These results are consistent with our expectation that 
deviations from optimal trade credit decrease firm profitability. Columns 2, 4, 6 and 8 separate 
a potential asymmetric effect between below- and above-optimum deviations. In Columns 2 
and 6, the coefficient of DEVIATION_TCR is negative and significant, but that of 
INTERACT_TCR is statistically insignificant. On the other hand, DEVIATION_TCP is 
negative and statistically significant while INTERACT_TCP positive and significant when 
both measures of profitability are employed. According to Martínez-Sola et al. (2013a), 
INTERACT_TCR and INTERACT_TCP could be negative or positive. However, the most 
important point here is that the sum of the coefficients α1 + α2 remains negative and statistically 
significant. In Columns 2, 4, 6 and 8, the sum of the coefficients α1 + α2 is negative, and the F-
test shows that the sum of these two coefficients is statistically significant. In line with our 
expectation, above-optimal and below-optimal deviations decrease firm profitability. 
Finally, the findings above further confirm the existence of an optimal trade credit level 
which maximizes SMEs’ profitability. If firms move away from this point, their profitability 
will decrease. Managers of SMEs should therefore try to keep their trade credit level as close 
to the optimal point as possible.
[Insert Table 6 here]
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5.2. The speed of adjustment of SMEs to the optimal trade credit level
With the existence of an optimal trade credit in SMEs, it is interesting to find out whether 
or not SMEs adjust their trade credit level towards the optimum; and if so how speedily. 
Following Baños-Caballero et al. (2013) and García‐Teruel and Martínez‐Solano (2010a), the 
partial adjustment models are presented as follows:
For trade credit receivable (TCR):
                                            TCRit - TCRit-1 = γ (TCR*it - TCRit-1) + εit    (13)
For trade credit payable (TCP):
                                            TCPit - TCPit-1 = γ (TCP*it - TCPit-1) + εit (14)
where (TCR*it - TCRit-1) and (TCP*it - TCPit-1) show the adjustment required to reach the 
optimal level. TCR*it is the optimal point of trade credit receivable and TCP*it is the optimal 
point of trade credit payable. These two variables are estimated using Equations (7) and (8). 
The coefficient γ measures the rate of adjustment of firms to the optimal point, and it takes a 
value between 0 and 1. If γ is equal to 0, firms do not modify their existing level of trade credit 
perhaps because of high cost of adjustment. If it is 1, firms adjust trade credit level towards the 
optimal point immediately. 
Substituting (7) and (8) into (13) and (14), we obtain the new equations as follows:
For trade credit receivable (TCR)
TCRit = α +δ0 TCRit-1 + δ1 SIZE it + δ2 GROWTH it + δ3 STDEBT it + δ4 TURN it + δ5 CFLOWit
+ δ6 GROF it + ηi + λt + εit (15)
For trade credit payable (TCP):
TCPit = α + δ0TCPit-1 + δ1SIZEit + δ2GROWTHit + δ3 STDEBTit + δ4LTDEBTit +δ5TURNit         
+ δ6CFLOWi,t + δ7CASH it + ηi + λt + εit (16)
where α = β0γ; δ0 = (1 – γ); δk = γβk; ɳi is unobservable heterogeneity. λt are time dummy 
variables; and εit = γvit. If the value of coefficient δ0 is higher, this indicates a lower adjustment 
speed.    
The estimation results are presented in Table 7 which shows that the coefficients of the 
lagged trade credit receivable (TCR) and the lagged trade credit payable (TCP) are both 
positive and significant at the 1 per cent level. The coefficient of the lagged TCR is 0.189, so 
the adjustment coefficient of TCR (γ) is 0.811. Similarly, the coefficient of the lagged TCP is 
0.159, indicating the adjustment coefficient of TCP (γ) is 0.841. These results indicate that the 
speed of adjustment of firms to their optimal point is relatively high. 
[Insert Table 7 here]
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5.3. Endogeneity 
Previous studies indicate that the problem of potential endogeneity could seriously 
impact on the estimation outcomes hence financial decisions (Martínez-Sola et al., 2014; Pais 
and  Gama, 2015; Lyngstadaas and  Berg, 2016). This problem arises because it is possible that 
the association between investment in trade credit and firm profitability reflects a bi-directional 
influence between profitability and trade credit investment. To control for this problem, this 
study resorts to instrumental variables method to estimate equations (1), (2), (5), and (6). In 
particular, the first lag of the independent variables TCR and TCP are used as instrumental 
variables. 
As shown in Table 8, the coefficients of TCR and TCP are positive and significant (β1 > 
0), while those of TCR2 and TCP2 are negative and significant (β2 < 0) for the two alternative 
proxies of firm profitability. Hence, the instrumental variable estimation results do not alter the 
earlier conclusion that there exists an invested U-shaped relationship between trade credit and 
SMEs’ profitability, although the sizes of the coefficients do change a little. 
Table 9 shows that less and more financially constrained firms have significant and 
positive coefficients of TCR and TCP in all the classifications used. Their coefficients of TCR2 
and TCP2 are negative and significant. Thus, the results again confirm that these firms have a 
concave relationship between trade credit and irm profitability. 
When cash flow is used as a proxy for financial constraints and gross operating income 
is used as a proxy for firm profitability, the optimal point of TCR appears at 0.376, and that of 
TCP is 0.167 for less financially constrained firms. On the other hand, for more financially 
constrained firms, the optimal points of TCR and TCP are 0.131 and 0.034, respectively. When 
external financing costs is used to classify firms, the optimal points of TCR are 0.310 and 0.223 
for less and more financially constrained firms respectively. The optimal point of TCP is 0.160 
for less financially constrained firms and 0.133 for more financially constrained firms. When 
net operating income is used as a profit proxy, this study also finds a similar pattern emerged. 
These findings confirm the earlier results that more financially constrained companies have 
lower optimal level of trade credit than less financially constrained ones. In general, all results 
are consistent with those displayed in Tables 4 and 5 but the estimated optimal TCR and TCP 
are lower when instrumental estimator are used.
[Insert Tables 8 and 9 here]
6. Conclusions
This paper provides empirical evidence of a non-linear association between trade credit 
and SMEs profitability with both aspects of trade credit considered, including trade credit 
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receivable (TCR) and trade credit payable (TCP). The study is based on  a panel data set of 
1,509 non –financial listed SMEs from nine countries or territories in East Asia and the Pacific, 
namely, China, Vietnam, Malaysia, Thailand, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and 
Ho g Kong, over the seven-year period from 2010 to 2016. The findings indicate an inverted 
U-shaped relationship between TCR, TCP and firm profitability; that is, SMEs have an optimal 
trade credit level that balances between benefits and costs to maximize their profitability. 
Further investigations demonstrate that the profitability of firms will decrease when their trade 
credit level moves away from the optimal trade credit. . Moreover, firms display fast adjustment 
towards the optimum. Thus, this study suggests that trade credit is a crucial factor which 
influences SMEs’ profitability, and managers of SMEs should try to keep the level of trade 
credit investment as close to the optimal point as possible. 
Given that accessing formal finance is the greatest challenge facing SMEs in the East 
Asia and Pacific region, this paper analyses whether the optimal level of investment in TCR 
and TCP changes according to their financial constraints. By taking cash flow and external 
financing cost as proxies of financial constraints to classify firms, the paper shows that a 
concave relationship between trade credit and profitability exists in both more and less 
financially constrained firms. However, more financially constrained firms have lower optimal 
trade credit level than less financially constrained ones. 
Although this study shows an inverted U-shaped association between trade credit and 
firm profitability, it has some limitations that may warrant investigations in the future. First, 
this study focuses only on listed SMEs in East Asia and the Pacific, and so the findings cannot 
be blindly applied to all SMEs in this region, especially unlisted SMEs. In fact, for non-listed 
SMEs, access to the financial markets is even harder than for listed ones; hence, managing their 
trade credit may be even more important. Second, this research only uses a sample of listed 
SMEs for a seven-year period from 2010 to 2016 – a calmer period after the financial crisis. 
However, problems of liquidity and financial constraints will increase in times of general 
financial crisis, and hence, provision and receipt of trade credit by SMEs will be different from 
the periods before and after the crisis. It would be interesting in the future to conduct similar 
research to compare outcomes among different periods.
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Appendix A. Definition of SMEs in the Sampled Countries
Criteria and the country’s official definitionCountry Industry Employees Operating income Total capital Sales turnover Fixed assets Stated capital
Agriculture, Forestry, 
Animal husbandry, and 
Fisher
≤  1000 ≤ 20 million yuan
Manufacturing ≤  1000 ≤ 400 million yuan
Construction ≤  1000 ≤ 800 million yuan
Transportation and postal 
industry
≤  1000 ≤ 300 million yuan
Wholesale Businesses ≤  200 ≤ 400 million yuan
Warehousing ≤  200 ≤ 300 million yuan
Retail ≤ 300 ≤ 200 million yuan
China
Hotel service and catering ≤ 300 ≤ 100 million yuan
Agriculture, forestry, 
fisheries, industry and 
construction
10 - 300 20 billion - 100 
billion VND
Vietnam
Trade and services 10 - 100 10 billion - 50 
billion VND
Manufacturing 5 - 200 300.000 – 50 
million RM
Malaysia
Non-manufacturing 5 - 75 300.000 – 20 
million RM
Manufacturing and Service ≤ 200 ≤ 200 million 
THB
Wholesale ≤ 50 ≤ 100 million 
THB
Thailand
Retail ≤ 30 ≤ 60 million 
THB
Japan Manufacturing, 
construction, transportation, 
and other industries
≤ 300 ≤ 300 million Yen
Wholesale trade ≤ 100 ≤ 100 million Yen
Service and retail trade ≤ 100 ≤ 50 million Yen
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Criteria and the country’s official definitionCountry Industry Employees Operating income Total capital Sales turnover Fixed assets Stated capital
Manufacturing industries (6) ≤ 150 billion 
KRW
Manufacturing industries 
(12), agriculture/ forestry/ 
fishery, electricity, gas, 
water business, wholesale/ 
retail business, mining 
industry, and construction 
industry
≤ 100 billion 
KRW
Other manufacturing 
industries (6), transportation 
business, sewage disposal/ 
environment remediation 
business, publication/ 
information service business
≤ 80 billion 
KRW
Repair / other personal 
service business; Business-
supporting service business; 
Science/technology service 
business; Health / social 
welfare business; Art/sports 
service business
≤ 60 billion 
KRW
South 
Korea
Lodging/restaurant 
business; Educational 
service business
≤ 40 billion 
KRW
Taiwan Manufacturing, 
construction, mining and 
quarrying industries
≤  200 ≤  80 million 
TWD
Commerce, transportation 
services, and other services
≤  100 ≤  100 million 
TWD
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Criteria and country’s official definitionCountry Industry Employees Operating income Total capital Sales turnover Fixed assets Stated capital
Singapore Manufacturing and Non-
Manufacturing
≤ 200 ≤  100 million 
SGD
Hong Kong Manufacturing ≤ 100
Non – Manufacturing ≤ 50
Sources: The National Bureau of Statistics of China (OECD, 2016), Vietnamese Ministry of Planning and Investment (2009), National SME Development Council 
(NSDC), Office of Small and Medium Enterprises Promotion (2004), Small and Medium Enterprise Agency (2016), Ministry of SMEs and Startups (2015), Small 
and Medium Enterprise Administration (2017), Spring Singapore (2014), and Trade and Industry Department (2012). 
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Appendix B. Definition of dependent and independent variables in this study
Variables Acronym Measurement
Gross operating income PRO1 (Sales– costs of sales) ÷ total assets
Net operating income PRO2 ( Sales – costs of sales – depreciation and Amortization) ÷ total assets
Trade credit receivable TCR The ratio of accounts receivable to total sales
Trade credit payable TCP The ratio of accounts payable to total assets
Financial leverage LEV The ratio of total debt  to total assets
Cash ratio CASH The ratio of cash and cash equivalents to total assets 
Liquidity ratio LIQ The ratio of current assets to current liabilities
Assets tangibility ATAN The ratio of fixed assets to total assets
Sales growth GROWTH (Salest – Salest-1) ÷ Salest-1
Firm size SIZE The natural logarithm of total assets
Industry deviation INDUST The absolute value of the difference between the firm cash holding and the industry mean. 
Annual GDP growth GDP (GDPt – GDPt-1) ÷ GDPt-1
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Figure 1. Evolution of trade credit in SMEs from 2010 to 2016. The ratios are calculated 
using data extracted from Bloomberg
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Table 1. The number of SMEs selected for this study
Country SMEs market Listed of companies
China ChiNext 276
Vietnam HNX 130
Malaysia ACE market 71
Thailand MAI 68
JASDAQ 220
Japan
MOTHER 26
South Korea KOSDAQ 353
Taiwan GreTai 164
Singapore SGX Catalist 125
Hong Kong GEM 76
Total 1,509
Page 38 of 49International Journal of Managerial Finance
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
International Journal of M
anagerial Finance
Table 2. Summary statistics 
Variable Observation Mean Median Std. Dev Min Max
PRO1 10,537 0.2073 0.1709 0.1550 0.0119 0.5840
PRO2 10,537 0.1797 0.1442 0.1530 -0.0207 0.5502
TCR 10,537 0.2487 0.2014 0.1959 0.0077 0.7671
TCP 10,537 0.0805 0.0566 0.0766 0.0000 0.2688
LEV 10,537 0.3532 0.3320 0.2063 0.0488 0.7508
CASH 10,537 0.2028 0.1467 0.1780 0.0063 0.6230
LIQ 10,537 3.3811 2.2014 3.1127 0.4643 12.463
ATAN 10,537 0.2064 0.1510 0.1901 0.0000 0.6384
GROWTH 10,537 0.1077 0.0513 0.3206 -0.4318 0.9176
SIZE 10,537 3.1281 3.3372 1.3416 0.1463 5.1720
INDUST 10,537 0.0753 0.0508 0.0698 0.0046 0.2582
GDP 10,537 0.0445 0.0368 0.0273 0.0081 0.1063
Notes: All independent and dependent variables are defined in Appendix B.  
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Table 3. Correlation matrix 
PRO1 PRO2 TCR TCP LEV CASH LIQ ATAN GROWTH SIZE INDUST GDP
PRO1 1.00
PRO2 0.98*** 1.00
TCR -0.20*** -0.19*** 1.00
TCP 0.16*** 0.17*** 0.11*** 1.00
LEV 0.06*** 0.04*** -0.03** 0.43*** 1.00
CASH 0.21*** 0.24*** 0.02 -0.10*** -0.34*** 1.00
LIQ -0.03** -0.005 0.09*** -0.34*** -0.66*** 0.52*** 1.00
ATAN 0.08*** 0.05*** -0.07*** 0.05*** 0.09*** -0.16*** -0.12*** 1.00
GROWTH 0.09*** 0.11*** 0.07*** 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.02** -0.01 -0.0006 1.00
SIZE -0.19*** -0.16*** 0.27*** -0.02* 0.03*** 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.0045 0.16*** 1.00
INDUST 0.24*** 0.19*** -0.12*** -0.03*** 0.003 0.11*** 0.03*** -0.03*** -0.01 -0.32*** 1.00
GDP -0.08*** -0.06*** 0.23*** -0.01 -0.17*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.04*** 0.21*** 0.01 -0.04*** 1.00
Notes: All independent and dependent variables are defined in Appendix B.  The symbols *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels respectively.
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Table 4. The non-linear relationship between trade credit and firm profitability (using 
Fixed Effect Model)
PRO1 PRO2Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
TCR 0.187*** 0.167***
(5.57) (5.04)
TCR2 -0.292*** -0.268***
(-7.45) (-6.94)
TCP 0.919*** 0.853***
(10.41) (9.58)
TCP2 -2.361*** -2.115***
(-7.44) (-6.63)
LEV 0.084*** 0.058*** 0.076*** 0.050***
(5.57) (3.78) (5.13) (3.27)
CASH 0.098*** 0.101*** 0.101*** 0.104***
(6.86) (7.21) (7.18) (7.57)
LIQ -0.000021 0.002** -0.000027 0.001*
(-0.03) (1.98) (-0.04) (1.83)
ATAN 0.102*** 0.100*** 0.074*** 0.072***
(7.04) (7.21) (5.05) (5.17)
GROWTH 0.061*** 0.060*** 0.062*** 0.061***
(18.18) (18.57) (18.58) (18.87)
SIZE 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.004
(0.40) (-0.37) (-0.42) (-1.26)
INDUST 0.357*** 0.346*** 0.297*** 0.286***
(11.33) (11.10) (9.45) (9.22)
GDP 0.326*** 0.268*** 0.301*** 0.245***
(3.70) (3.09) (3.36) (2.76)
Constant 0.060*** 0.050*** 0.060*** 0.049***
(5.39) (4.42) (5.32) (4.36)
Hausman 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Modified Wald 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Wooldridge 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R-squared 0.221 0.238 0.192 0.208
Observations 10,537 10,537 10,537 10,537
Notes: In Columns (1) and (2), the dependent variable is gross operating income 
(PRO1). In Columns (3) and (4), the dependent variable is net operating income (PRO2). 
All models are estimated with robust standard errors. Time dummies are included in all 
regressions. Hausman is the p-value of the Hausman (1978) test used to choose between 
Fixed Effect Model (FEM) and Random Effect Model (REM). Modified Wald is the p-
value of the Modified Wald test for heteroscedasticity. Wooldridge is the p-value of the 
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation. All independent and dependent variables are 
defined in Appendix B. t-statistics are in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
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Table 5. The influence of financial constraints on the relationship between trade credit receivable and firm profitability (using Fixed 
Effect Model)
PRO1 PRO2
Cash flow External ﬁnancing cost Cash flow External ﬁnancing costVariables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
TCR 0.307*** 0.275*** 0.282*** 0.268***
(9.007) (7.72) (8.40) (7.66)
TCR * FC -0.246*** -0.169*** -0.240*** -0.200***
(-20.96) (-6.30) (-20.73) (-7.51)
TCR2 -0.328*** -0.391*** -0.301*** -0.388***
(-8.00) (-9.00) (-7.45) (-9.02)
TCR2 * FC 0.143*** 0.225*** 0.139*** 0.277***
(13.19) (4.27) (13.35) (5.31)
TCP 0.788*** 1.163*** 0.776*** 1.276***
(15.20) (12.14) (14.90) (11.18)
TCP * FC -0.657*** -0.359*** -0.642*** -0.530***
(-16.75) (-4.38) (-16.37) (-5.31)
TCP2 -0.888*** -2.974*** -0.838*** -3.292***
(-6.36) (-8.06) (-6.06) (-7.37)
TCP2 * FC 0.604*** 0.846** 0.580*** 1.304***
(4.18) (2.01) (4.03) (2.95)
LEV 0.090*** 0.071*** 0.091*** 0.066*** 0.083*** 0.061*** 0.084*** 0.073***
(6.15) (4.79) (6.03) (4.28) (5.70) (4.26) (5.68) (3.61)
CASH 0.091*** 0.093*** 0.094*** 0.095*** 0.095*** 0.096*** 0.097*** 0.109***
(6.58) (6.77) (6.63) (6.86) (6.93) (7.13) (6.93) (6.70)
LIQ 0.0002 0.0014* -0.0002 0.002** 0.0002 0.0013* -0.00018 0.0019**
(0.29) (1.77) (-0.20) (2.21) (0.28) (1.70) (-0.23) (2.12)
ATAN 0.103*** 0.107*** 0.102*** 0.101*** 0.074*** 0.078*** 0.074*** 0.080***
(7.22) (7.82) (7.00) (7.23) (5.16) (5.65) (5.02) (4.58)
GROWTH 0.050*** 0.049*** 0.059*** 0.059*** 0.051*** 0.050*** 0.059*** 0.068***
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(15.96) (15.61) (17.80) (18.31) (16.44) (16.00) (18.17) (17.57)
SIZE 0.001 0.001 0.0024 -0.001 -0.0014 -0.0018 -0.0001 -0.0082**
(0.38) (0.39) (0.74) (-0.31) (-0.47) (-0.63) (-0.03) (-2.07)
INDUST 0.346*** 0.334*** 0.354*** 0.342*** 0.286*** 0.274*** 0.293*** 0.278***
(11.46) (11.19) (11.28) (11.04) (9.49) (9.22) (9.39) (7.48)
GDP 0.282*** 0.233*** 0.308*** 0.244*** 0.258*** 0.209** 0.281*** 0.231**
(3.30) (2.72) (3.52) (2.82) (2.95) (2.39) (3.15) (2.13)
Constant 0.059*** 0.055*** 0.060*** 0.049*** 0.058*** 0.059*** 0.059*** 0.052***
(5.42) (4.97) (5.38) (4.40) (5.40) (5.32) (5.36) (3.95)
F1 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.00
F2 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.03 0.00
R-squared 0.278 0.290 0.230 0.246 0.249 0.261 0.203 0.189
Observations 10,537 10,537 10,537 10,537 10,537 10,537 10,537 10,537
Notes: In Columns (1), (2), (3), and (4), the dependent variable is gross operating income (PRO1). In Columns (5), (6), (7) and (8), the dependent 
variable is net operating income (PRO2). FC is a dummy variable representing financial constraints and it takes the value one for ﬁrms more 
likely to be ﬁnancially constrained and zero otherwise. In Columns (1), (2), (5), and (6), we estimate models (5) and (6) by using the cash flow 
to classify firms that are suffering from financial constraints and those that are not. In Columns (3), (4), (7), and (8), we estimate models (5) and 
(6) by using the external financing cost to classify firms that are suffering from financial constraints and those that are not. All models are 
estimated with robust standard errors. Time dummies are included in all regressions. All independent and dependent variables are defined in 
Appendix B. F1 is the p-value of a F-test for the linear restriction test under the following null hypothesis: H0: (β1 + α1) = 0. F2 is the p-value of 
a F-test for the linear restriction test under the following null hypothesis: H0: (β2 + α2) = 0. t-statistics are in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and 
*** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.  
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Table 6. The relationship between deviations from optimal trade credit level and firm profitability (using Fixed Effect Model)
PRO1 PRO2Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
DEVIATION_TCR -0.059*** -0.07* -0.061*** -0.066*
(-4.33) (-1.70) (-4.61) (-1.66)
INTERACT_TCR -0.011 -0.01
(-0.23) (-0.21)
DEVIATION_TCP -0.253*** -0.707*** -0.233*** -0.656***
(-4.71) (-6.70) (-4.30) (-6.10)
INTERACT_TCP 0.601*** 0.559***
(5.66) (5.16)
LEV 0.095*** 0.123*** 0.132*** 0.125*** 0.086*** 0.103*** 0.118*** 0.111***
(6.39) (6.26) (6.54) (6.31) (5.89) (5.31) (5.82) (5.58)
CASH 0.102*** 0.106*** 0.127*** 0.133*** 0.105*** 0.116*** 0.132*** 0.138***
(7.08) (6.45) (7.53) (7.88) (7.37) (6.95) (7.85) (8.18)
LIQ 0.0003 0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0008 0.0002 0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0008
(0.35) (0.41) (-0.18) (-0.95) (0.31) (0.47) (-0.20) (-0.91)
ATAN 0.106*** 0.070*** 0.118*** 0.121*** 0.077*** 0.085*** 0.089*** 0.092***
(7.29) (6.04) (6.65) (6.82) (5.27) (4.69) (4.95) (5.09)
GROWTH 0.064*** 0.070*** 0.069*** 0.0681*** 0.065*** 0.073*** 0.073*** 0.072***
(19.31) (17.95) (18.06) (17.87) (19.67) (18.50) (18.62) (18.45)
SIZE 0.0033 -0.0012 -0.0022 -0.0023 0.0003 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005
(1.09) (-0.30) (-0.55) (-0.58) (0.09) (-1.02) (-1.29) (-1.32)
INDUST 0.362*** 0.232*** 0.375*** 0.362*** 0.301*** 0.299*** 0.299*** 0.287***
(11.45) (6.99) (10.17) (9.94) (9.57) (7.86) (7.94) (7.71)
GDP 0.332*** 0.390*** 0.378*** 0.385*** 0.307*** 0.329*** 0.329*** 0.335***
(3.74) (3.83) (3.492) (3.55) (3.40) (2.99) (3.00) (3.04)
Constant 0.064*** 0.083*** 0.063*** 0.052*** 0.063*** 0.069*** 0.064*** 0.054***
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(5.67) (6.18) (4.720) (3.81) (5.57) (5.02) (4.77) (3.93)
F-test 0.000 0.050 0.000 0.078
R-squared 0.213 0.175 0.189 0.195 0.186 0.160 0.160 0.165
Observations 10,537 10,537 10,537 10,537 10,537 10,537 10,537 10,537
Notes: In Columns (1), (2), (3) and (4), the dependent variable is gross operating income (PRO1). In Columns (5), (6), (7) and (8), the 
dependent variable is net operating income (PRO2). DEVIATION_TCR and DEVIATION_TCP are the residuals from optimal level of 
trade credit receivable and trade credit payable, respectively. INTERACT_TCR is DEVIATION_TCR * above-optimal. INTERACT_TCP 
is DEIVATION_TCP * above-optimal. The above-optimal is a dummy variable that takes 0 for negative residuals and 1 otherwise. All 
control variables are defined in Appendix B. All models are estimated with robust standard errors. Time dummies are included in all 
regressions. F-test is the p-value of a F-test for the null hypothesis that the sum of the coefficients of deviation and interact is zero.
t-statistics are in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.  
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Table 7. The speed of adjustment of SMEs to the optimal trade credit level (using Fixed 
Effect Model)
TCR TCPVariables (1) (2)
TCRt-1 0.189***
(9.02)
TCPt-1 0.159***
(9.34)
SIZE 0.040*** 0.007***
(7.40) (3.79)
GROWTH -0.044*** 0.004**
(-7.02) (2.48)
STDEBT 0.004 -0.037***
(0.42) (-8.77)
LTDEBT ___ -0.031***
(-6.87)
TURN -0.004 0.037***
(-0.63) (15.38)
CFLOW -0.030** -0.018***
(-2.01) (-5.92)
CASH ___ -0.040***
(-7.27)
GROF 0.092*** ___
(2.98)
Constant 0.064*** 0.031***
(3.03) (4.50)
R-squared 0.088 0.219
Observations 9,025 9,025
Notes: In Column (1), the dependent variable is trade credit receivable (TCR). In 
Column (2), the dependent variable is trade credit payable (TCP). Firm size (SIZE) is 
the natural logarithm of total assets. Sales growth (GROWTH) is measured as (Salest 
– Salest-1) ÷ Salest-1. Short-term finance (STDEBT) is calculated as short-term 
financial debt ÷ total assets. Long-term finance (LTDEBT) is calculated as long-term 
debt ÷ total assets. Product quality (TURN) is measured as total sales ÷ (total assets - 
accounts receivable). Cash flow (CFLOW) is calculated as (net income + depreciation) 
÷ total sales. Cash ratio (CASH) is calculated as (cash + cash equivalents) ÷ total 
assets. Profit margin (GROF) is calculated as gross profit ÷ sales. All models are 
estimated with robust standard errors. Time dummies are included in all regressions. 
t-statistics are in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels respectively.  
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Table 8. The non-linearity relationship between trade credit and firm profitability 
(using instrumental variables)
PRO1 PRO2Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
TCR 0.131*** 0.117**
(2.61) (2.37)
TCR2 -0.406*** -0.375***
(-6.12) (-5.81)
TCP 1.658** 1.647**
(2.25) (2.38)
TCP2 -5.466* -5.240*
(-1.86) (-1.90)
LEV -0.029*** -0.043** -0.025** -0.045***
(-2.59) (-2.43) (-2.26) (-2.65)
CASH 0.234*** 0.227*** 0.251*** 0.242***
(21.35) (18.22) (23.09) (19.72)
LIQ -0.008*** -0.004** -0.007*** -0.003*
(-11.02) (-2.04) (-10.16) (-1.69)
ATAN 0.051*** 0.067*** 0.031*** 0.046***
(5.93) (6.52) (3.57) (4.53)
GROWTH 0.059*** 0.061*** 0.061*** 0.063***
(11.56) (12.19) (12.22) (12.73)
SIZE -0.023*** -0.027*** -0.019*** -0.023***
(-16.67) (-16.38) (-13.96) (-14.08)
INDUST 0.202*** 0.244*** 0.101*** 0.147***
(7.00) (7.87) (3.49) (4.76)
GDP -0.406*** -1.166*** -0.440*** -1.169***
(-5.66) (-11.15) (-6.06) (-11.58)
Constant 0.245*** 0.193*** 0.212*** 0.158***
(23.04) (6.93) (20.42) (5.98)
R-squared 0.184 0.171 0.160 0.150
Observations 9,025 9,025 9,025 9,025
Notes: In Columns (1) and (2), the dependent variable is gross operating income 
(PRO1). In Columns (3) and (4), the dependent variable is net operating income 
(PRO2). All models are estimated with robust standard errors. Time dummies are 
included in all regressions. All independent and dependent variables are defined in 
Appendix B. t-statistics are in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.  
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Table 9. The influence of financial constraints on the relationship between trade credit receivable and firm profitability (using 
instrumental variables)
PRO1 PRO2
Cash flow External ﬁnancing cost Cash flow External ﬁnancing costVariables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
TCR 0.809*** 0.745*** 0.752*** 0.768***
(9.25) (7.90) (8.47) (8.26)
TCR * FC -0.577*** -0.310*** -0.536*** -0.333***
(-20.77) (-12.31) (-19.40) (-13.32)
TCR2 -1.075*** -1.202*** -1.005*** -1.219***
(-8.32) (-8.95) (-7.64) (-9.22)
TCR2 * FC 0.189*** 0.226*** 0.177*** 0.242***
(6.45) (7.67) (6.06) (8.30)
TCP 1.931*** 1.368*** 1.811*** 1.482***
(10.63) (6.62) (9.94) (7.21)
TCP * FC -1.725*** -0.642*** -1.578*** -0.735***
(-16.17) (-7.29) (-14.82) (-8.37)
TCP2 -5.779*** -4.281*** -5.190*** -4.541***
(-7.14) (-4.66) (-6.41) (-4.99)
TCP2 * FC 2.780*** 1.542*** 2.560*** 1.770***
(7.33) (4.53) (6.84) (5.27)
LEV 0.009 -0.027** -0.003 -0.037*** 0.0104 -0.032*** 0.003 -0.036***
(0.80) (-2.32) (-0.30) (-3.07) (0.95) (-2.81) (0.23) (-2.99)
CASH 0.232*** 0.222*** 0.209*** 0.216*** 0.249*** 0.238*** 0.224*** 0.228***
(21.86) (20.35) (18.37) (18.68) (23.60) (21.92) (19.83) (19.86)
LIQ -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.008*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.004*** -0.008*** -0.005***
(-8.83) (-6.49) (-11.16) (-7.52) (-8.04) (-5.60) (-10.28) (-6.35)
ATAN 0.030*** 0.054*** 0.046*** 0.072*** 0.011 0.034*** 0.025*** 0.050***
(3.54) (6.42) (5.20) (8.50) (1.32) (4.06) (2.85) (5.90)
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GROWTH 0.032*** 0.033*** 0.055*** 0.058*** 0.036*** 0.038*** 0.057*** 0.059***
(6.34) (6.91) (10.55) (11.51) (7.32) (7.85) (11.10) (11.98)
SIZE -0.025*** -0.025*** -0.024*** -0.026*** -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.020*** -0.022***
(-17.40) (-18.78) (-16.89) (-19.35) (-14.58) (-15.55) (-14.28) (-16.20)
INDUST 0.190*** 0.198*** 0.213*** 0.226*** 0.090*** 0.104*** 0.112*** 0.129***
(6.95) (7.184) (7.32) (7.77) (3.24) (3.73) (3.85) (4.44)
GDP -0.650*** -1.202*** -0.291*** -1.054*** -0.666*** -1.192*** -0.315*** -1.060***
(-8.73) (-19.28) (-3.78) (-16.52) (-8.85) (-18.88) (-4.05) (-16.40)
Constant 0.213*** 0.229*** 0.199*** 0.219*** 0.181*** 0.193*** 0.163*** 0.181***
(17.19) (22.61) (15.29) (20.80) (14.68) (19.32) (12.70) (17.45)
F1 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.00
F2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
R-squared 0.172 0.219 0.142 0.197 0.146 0.197 0.114 0.178
Observations 9,025 9,025 9,025 9,025 9,025 9,025 9,025 9,025
Notes: In Columns (1), (2), (3), and (4), the dependent variable is gross operating income (PRO1). In Columns (5), (6), (7) and (8), the 
dependent variable is net operating income (PRO2). FC is a dummy variable representing financial constraints and it takes the value 
one for ﬁrms more likely to be ﬁnancially constrained and zero otherwise. In Columns (1), (2), (5), and (6), we estimate models (5) 
and (6) by using the cash flow to classify firms that are suffering from financial constraints and those that are not. In Columns (3), (4), 
(7), and (8), we estimate models (5) and (6) by using the external financing cost to classify firms that are suffering from financial 
constraints and those that are not. All models are estimated with robust standard errors. Time dummies are included in all regressions. 
All independent and dependent variables are defined in Appendix B. F1 is the p-value of a F-test for the linear restriction test under 
the following null hypothesis: H0: (β1 + α1) = 0. F2 is the p-value of a F-test for the linear restriction test under the following null 
hypothesis: H0: (β2 + α2) = 0. t-statistics are in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels respectively.  
Page 49 of 49 International Journal of Managerial Finance
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
